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were present at the council meeting to testify as to what 
occurred there and to give oral evidence as to what evidence 
was presented at the council meeting. Counsel for the city 
objected that the best evidence rule was thereby violated, 
but the objection was overruled. If the record of the hear-
ing before the council had been introduced, as it should have 
been, the court would then have been in the same position 
as if it had proceeded by certiorari. 
While the law thus seems to be settled in this state that 
local agencies may exercise adjudicating powers and that 
their decisions are respected by courts if there is subst.antial 
evidence to support them, it is anomalous that the Legisla-
ture is without power to put the decision of state boards 
on the same footing. In Laisne v. California State Board 01 
Optometry, 19 Cal. (2d) 831 [123 P. (2d) 457], a majority 
of this court held that it would be an unconstitutional vest-
ing of judicial power in a state board to give any degree 
of finality to its decision of issues of fact in the revocation 
of a professional license. In consequence, there must be a 
complete judicial retrial of its fact decisions. The objections 
to that doctrine are set forth at length in the dissenting 
opinion in the Laisne case. The majority opinion there con-
cluded that such constitutional judicial power could be vested 
in local administrative bodies and that the exercise of such 
power could be controlled, as to local boards, by the writ 
of certiorari. (Laisne v. California State Board of Optom-
etry, supra, p. 847.) The inconsistency in characterizing the 
revocation of a license by :1 state-wide board as ministerial 
and reviewable by mandamus, while the same function when 
performed by a local board would be judicial and review-
able by certiorari, has been pointed out in the Laisne dis-
sent and elsewhere. (La,isne v. California State Board of 
Optometry, supra, p. 869; see Elliott, Certiorari and the 
Local Board [1941], 29 Cal. L. Rev. 586, 598; McGovney, 
Court Review of Administrative Decisions [1942], 15 So. Cal. 
L. Rcv. 391, 409; Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review the 
Acts of State-Wide Administrative Bodies in California (1941], 
29 Cal. L. Rev. 275; [1937] 25 Cal. L. Rev. 694, 704.) 
If the writ of certiorari lies to review the revocation of 
petitioner's license by the local board in the present case, 
it would follow under the majority opinion in the Laisne 
case that an exercise of constitutional judicial power is in-
volved. Upon what ground, then, can it be held consistently 
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that the writ of mandate is available f There is no refusal 
to perform a ministerial duty or absence of an adequate rem-
edy,as in Drummey v. State Boa;rd of Funeral Directors ~ 
Embalmers, 13 Cal. (2d) 75 [87 P. (2d) 848]. (See' Laisne 
v. California. State Board of Optometry, supra; p.833~) The 
only plausible· explanation for the extension of' mandate to 
review the acts of local boards seems to' be the 'tille:tpressed 
recognition that it is irrational to hold thata";pafticular 
activity, the revocation of licenses, is nonjudicial.and review-
able 'exclusively by mandate when the revocatioll is by '8 
state-wide board and still adhere to the older doctrine.,that 
it is a judicial function and reviewable by certiorari exclu~ 
sively when the revocation ,is by a local agencY'·I: .~. .,.' . 
If it were contended that the record of the city council's 
hearing disclosed that it had before. it other eyidencesup-
porting its decision than that disclosed by the, testimony 
in the trial court, there would be no alternative· but to re-
mand the case to' the trial court, with instructions to' issue 
a writ of certiorari. Since it appears,. however, that in the 
tria:! court counsel for the, city did not contend that the 
city council had before it any other evidence, it seems that 
the result would have been the same had the case been tried 
on certiorari. Consequently, it is unnecessary to dissent 
from the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 4425. In Bank. Sept. 29, 1942.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROY J. PUTNAM, 
Appellant. 
[1] . :::'ewdness-:-Preliminary Proccedings-Probable Oause.-Rcl1s-
onable or probable cause for the commitment· of a defendant 
is established where at a preliminary hearing a twelve-year-
old boy testifies that the defendant feIt his private parts, 
where his mother corroborated the fact of his making a com-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Lewdness, § 7; [2] Criminal Law, 
§ 686; [3] Criminal Law, § 717; [4] Criminal Law, § 686; Lewdness, 
§ 19; [5] Lewdness, § 21. 
• 
. ~ . 
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plaint, and where another witness testifies to having seen the 
defendant and the boy together on the day in question. 
[2] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Cautionary In-
structions-Minors.-Since as a general rule the testimony of 
children admittedly competent as witnesses is not less trust-
worthy than the testimony of older persons, ordinarily there 
is no occasion for a cautionary instruction on the basis of 
their immaturity. Hence, in a prosecution for violation of 
Pen. Code, § 288, in which the complaining witness is twelve 
years old, it is proper to refuse to give an instruction that the 
testimony of a ehild of immature years is to be viewed with 
great care and caution. 
[3] Id.-Instructions-Requests-Limitations on Rule.-It is in-. 
cumbent upon a court in a criminal case to instruct the jury 
on its own motion, charging them fully and fairly upon the 
law relating to the facts; and it is not relieved of the duty to 
give instructions whose necessity is developed through the 
evidence. An instruction is necessary if it is vital to a proper 
consideration of tae evidence by the jury. 
[4] Id.-Province of Court and Jury-Cautionary Instructions-
Sex Cases: Lewdness-Instructions-Cautionary Instructions. 
-In prosecutions for sex offenses, such as prosecutions for 
violation of Pen. Code, § 288, it is the duty of the trial court 
on its own motion to give a cautionary instruction to the effect 
that the charge is easily made and difficult to disprove, for 
which reason the testimony of the prosecuting witness should 
be examined with caution. 
[5] Lewdness-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions. - In a 
prosecution for violation of Pun. Code, § 288, the failure of the 
trial court on its own motion to instruct the jury to examine 
the testimony of the prosecuting witness with caution was 
reversible error where the witness testified that the defendant 
patted his leg and on one occasion touched his privates, and 
where his testimony at the trial ant! at the preliminary hear-
ing was inconsistent as to whether on such occasion he was in 
an automobile or defendant's room. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and· from an order denying a new trial. 
Arthur Crum, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for violation of Pen. Code, § 288. Judgment of 
convict.inn reversed. 
[2] See 27 Cal. Jur. l81. 
[3 J See 8 Cal. Jur, 309. 
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Mit' 
Gladys Towles Root and Eugene V. McPherson for Appel-
lant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Bayard Rhone, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Appellant, convicted oiviolatirig section 
288 of the Penal Code, appeals from the judgment· and froIl). 
an order denying a motion for a new trial. 
[1] Appellant contends at the outset that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion, made under· section 995 of the. 
Penal Code, to strike the information" on account . of the 
insufficiency of the preliminary transcript." At' the pre-
liminary hearing the complaining witn~ss, a boy tw~tve years 
old, testified as follows: He was playing in Westlake Park 
in the city of Los Angeles on April 9, 1941, when appellant 
offered him a job distributing handbills. He accepted the 
job and the following day met appellant in the park at an 
appointed time, and was told that appellant had to go home 
to change his clothes and then had to go to the printer's to 
get the bills because they weren't ready. The boy accom-
panied appellant in the latter's car to his lodgings a short 
distance from the park. During the ride appellant placed his 
hand on the boy's leg and in the words of the witness "on 
the way over to the house . . .. he kept feeling my priyate 
parts." When they arrived at a r()(jminghouSe they went 
to the room of appellant, who 'proceeded to change his clothes 
in the boy's presence, and asked if the witness wahted to see 
his private parts. The boy said no, and did not see them. 
Appellant also asked the boy if he knew what his own private 
parts· were. While appellant was engaged in changing hiE 
clothes, he again felt the boy's private parts. ,A few minutes 
later they left the house and the complainmg witness· told . 
appellant to "get a new boy, I'm through;" and' r8:n honie 
and reported the incident to his mother. At the hearing 
the boy's mother corroborated the complaint made by her son; 
The manager of appellant's rooming house testified that she. 
saw the complaining witness in the company of' appellant 
at the rooming house on the day in question:, . The,foregoip.g; 
testimony is sufficient tb establish that there'was'reasQnlible 
or probable cause for appellant's cOn1mitment;'~ndthatthe 
trial court did not abuse its discretio:ll m'denyingthe motion 
to set i aside the information, (In re McCarty,'~4d, Oaf :API), 
473 [35 P. (2d) 568]; In re Mesquita, 139 Cal.' App. 91 (33 
.~ 
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P. (2d) 459]; Ex parte Heacock, 8 Cal. App. 420 [97 
Pac. 77].) 
Appellant contends that the order denying his motion was 
based, not on the evidence presented at the hearing, but upon 
a statement by the prosecuting officer that additional evi-
dence would be presented at the trial. The argument on the 
motion and the comments of the trial judge reveal that the 
commitment was based upon the examination of the witnesses. 
Although at one time during the hearing on the motion the 
trial judge remarked, "I am frank to state that the showing 
On the part of the People, in my opinion is very slight here, " 
he later stated, in denying the motion, that he could not 
ignore the statement of the complaining witness, "That he 
kept feeling my private partS." 
Appellant lays great emphasis upon the contention that 
the trial court erred in refusing to give a cautionary instruc-
tion offered by appellant. Cautionary instructions in crim-
inal prosecutions for sex offenses originated with the observa-
tion of Sir Matthew Hale that rape is ," an accusation easily 
to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended 
by the party accused, though never so innocent." (1 Pleas 
of the Crown 634. See People v. Bens011" 6 Cal. 221 [65 Am. 
Dec. 506] ; People v. Rogers, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 371 [79 P. 
(2d) 404] ; Magwire. v. People, 7.7 Colo. 149 [235 Pac. 339] ; 
Doyle v. State, 39 Fla. 1/55 [22 So. 272, 63 Am. St. Rep. 
159] ; State v. Loomer, 105 Kan. 410 [184 Pac. 723] ; State 
v. Lightheart, 153 Minn. 40 [189 N. W. 408]; Crump v. 
Com., 98 Va. 833 [23 S.B. 760].) In a number of juris-
dictions such instructions are regarded as an improper in-
vasion of the province of the jury. (Doyle v. State, supra; 
Black v. State, 119 Ga. 746 [47 S. E. 370] ; State v. Peterson, 
102 Mont. 495 [59 P. (2d) 61]; State v. Birchard, 35 Ore. 
484 [59:Pac. 468] ; State v. Rutledge, 63 Utah 546 [227 Pac. 
. 479]; Crump v. Com., supra; see People v. Anthony, 185 
Cal. 152 [196 Pac. 47] ; People v. Barnett, 99 Cal. App. 409 
[278 Pac. 885]; People v. Hoosier, 24 Cal. App. 746 [142 
Pac. 514].) In some jurisdictions their allowance or refusal 
is wholly within the discretion of the trial court. (Magwire 
v. People, supra; State v. Trusty, 122 Iowa 82 [97 N. W. 
989] ; State v. Loomer, supra; Strand v. State, 36 Wyo. 78 
[252 Pac. 1030] ; Territory v. Bodine, 32 Haw. 28. See, also, 
People v. Barnett, supra; People v. Fraysier, 36 Cal. App. 
579 [172 Pac. 1126] ; People v. Currie, 16 Cal. App. 731 
[117 Pac. 941].) In still others failure to give such instruc. 
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tions constitutes error and ground for reversal of judgments 
of conviction .. (People v. Adams, 14 Cal. (2d) 154 [93 P. 
(2d) 146] ; People v. Yaughan, 131 Cal. App. 265 [21 P. (2d) 
438] ; People v. Garrett, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 249 [81 P. (2d) 
. 241] ; Conners v.State, 47 Wis. 523[2 N. W. 1143] ; Rex v. 
Parkin, 31 Manitoba 438.) Any uncertainty as to the right 
of a defendant to such protection in this state was dispelled 
by this court in People v. Lucas, 16 Cal. (2d) 178 [105 P. 
(2d) 102, 130 A. L. R. 1485], stating: "We are firmly of 
the view that in all cases' of this character.· the. defendant' 
should be afforded the benefit of a cautionary instruction as 
was here requested to the general effect that such 'a 'charge. 
is easily made and difficult to disprove· for which reason the. 
testimony of the prosecuting witness should be _ examined 
with caution." (Compare People v. Rangod, 112 Cal. 669 
[44 Pac. 1071] ; People v. Knight, 63 Cal. App. 63 [218 Pac. 
79]; People v. Hoosier, supra, which were deci~ed before 
trial courts were authorized to comment on the .evidence.) 
[2] The instruction that appellant requested was: "You 
are hereby instructed to view with great care and caution the 
testimony of a child of immature years." The court prop-
erly refused to give this instruction, for it would have failed 
to instruct the jurors of the difficulty of defending against 
the charges made. Although ordinarily the jury need not 
be advised as . to the reasons for the rule of law in aninstruc-
tion, the facility with which charges of the kind here involved 
may be invented places the defendant in a peculiarly vulner-
able position, usually with no defense except his own denial 
of the asserted misconduct. The defendant is entitled to 
have the jurors informed that· the charges made' against_ 
him are "easily made and difficult to disprove" and that 
"the testim<Jny of the prosecuting witness should be exam~ 
ined with caution." (People v. Lucas, supra.) A simple 
admonition to view the testimony of the complaining witness 
with caution would be inadequate and misleading, for it 
would convey the impression that for undisclosed reasons the 
trial judge distrusts the testimony of the particular witness. 
(See People v. Rudolph, 28 Cal. App. 683 [153 Pac. 721] ; 
People v. Kawasaki, 23 Cal. App. 92 [137 Pac .. 287].) The 
cautionary instructions approved by the appellate courts 
of this state as well as others in cases like the present one 
have embodied the reasons that prompted them. (People v. 
Adams, 14 Cal. (2d) 154 [93 P. (2d) 146]; People. 'v. Gar· 
I.: 
:~~ 
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rett, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 249 [81 P. (2d) 241J; People v. 
Vaughtin,supra; People v. Hewitt, 78 CaL App. 426 [248 
Pac,. 1021] ; People v. Fraysier, supra; People v. Currie, 16 
Cal. App. 731 [117 Pac. 941].) 
The particular instruction requested in this case, stressing 
the witness's immaturity and seeking to have his testimony 
viewed with caution for that reason alone, was rejected by 
the trial court, probably because it did not' apply to the evi-
dence and circumstances of the case. (People v. Maughs, 149 
Cal. 253[86 Pac. 187] ; People v. Modina, 146 Cal. 142 [79 
Pac. 842]. 'See, also, cases cited in 8 Cal. Jur., p. 32l.) There 
is no general rule that the testimony of children admittedly 
competent as witnesses is less trustworthy than the testimony 
of older persons; hence there is ordinarily no occasion for a 
cautionary instruction on that basis. (See cases cited in 27 
Cal. Jur. 181.) In the present case the complaining witness 
was twelve years old, well above the age of the incompetent 
child witness envisaged in subdivision 2 of section 1880 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
[3] While the trial court did not err in refusing the par-
ticular instruction requested, it does not follow that it was 
justified in failing to give an appropriate instruction. (See 
People v. Frey, 165 Cal. 140 [131 Pac. 127] ; People v. Tapia, 
131 Cal. 647 [63 Pac. 1001].) It is incumbent upon a court 
in a criminal case to instruct the jury of its own motion, 
charging them fully and fairly upon the law relating to the 
facts of the case. (People v. Warren, 16 Cal. (2d) 103 [104 
P. (2d) 1024]; People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703 [265 Pac. 
914] ; People v. Nudo, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 381 [101 P. (2d) 
162] ; People v. Curran, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 673 [75 P. (2d) 
1090] ; People v. Best, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 606 [57 P. (2d) 
168] ; see 8 Cal. Jur. 309.) The court is not relieved of the 
duty to give instructions whose necessity is' "developed 
through the evidence introduced at the trial." (People v. 
Warren, supra.) An instruction is necessary if it is vital to 
a proper consideration of the evidence by the jury. (People 
v. Warren, sttpra; People v. Tapia, supra; People v. Heddens, 
12 Cal. App. (2d) 245 [55 P. (2d) 230].) Accordingly, it has 
been held that the court must of its own motion instruct the 
jury in criminal cases with respect to accomplices and their 
testimony (People v. Warren, supra; People v. Heddens, 
supra), corroborative evidence in cases involving the obtain" 
ing of property by false pretenses (People v. Curran, supra), 
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App. 775 [26 P. (2d) 681]), admission of confessions and 
the necessity of independent proof of the corpus delicti (Peo-
ple v; Frey, supra (murder», definition of manslaughter in 
prosecution for murder where evidence might sustain verdict 
of manslaughter (People v. Manzo, 9 Cal. (2d) 594 [72 P. 
(2d) 119]), and presumption of innocence and' burden of 
proof (People v. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442 [67 Pac. 694] ; People 
v. Soldavini, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 460 [114 P. (2d) 415].) 
[4] A cautionary instruction in cases like the present one is 
necessary to insure a proper consideration of the evidence by 
the jury. It has long been recognized that there is no class 
of prosecutions "attended with so much danger or which af~ 
ford so ample an opportunity for the free play of malice or 
private vengeance." (People v. Benson, supra; see People v. 
Lucas, supra; People v. Adams, supra; People v. Baldwin, 
117 Cal. 244, 249 [49 Pac. 186] ; People v. Vaughan, supra.) 
Thus in the Adams case this court observed that" As a matter 
of practical observation to many judges who have presided 
over trials of this nature, it is plainly recognized that, not-
withstanding the salutary rule that an accused is presumed 
to be innocent until his guilt has been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt, nevertheless to the mind of the average 
citizen or juror,' the mere fact that a person has been accused 
of the commission of such an offense seems to constitute sufii~ 
cient evidence to warrant a verdict of 'guilty'; and that-'-
instead of its being necessary for the prosecution to prove his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-in order to secure an acquit-
tal of the charge, it becomes incumbent upon the accused to 
completely establish his innocence, and to accomplish that 
result not only by a preponderance of the evidence but beyond 
a reasonable doubt." 
The requirement of cautionary instructions in cases like 
the present one is prompted by the same considerations that 
necessitate instructions with respect to corroborative evidence. 
(See People v; Benson, supra; People v. Miller, 27 Oal. App. 
(2d) 722 [81 P. (2d) 567] ; People v. Garrett, supra; People 
v. Vaughan, S1lpra; People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal. App. 280 [203 
Pac. 440].) No corroboration is required in cases like the pres-
entone since it is ordinarily precluded by the very nature of 
theoffense. (People v. Troutman, 187 Ca1. 313 [201Pac. 928]; 
Peoplev.Spillard,15 Cal. App. (2d) 649 [59 P.(2d) 887]i 
People v. Von Benson, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 431 [101 P. (2d) 
527].) The rule permitting a conviction on the uncorroborated 
'" 
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testimony of the prosecuting witness is necessary to protect 
the public but it needs a counterweight to protect the accused. 
The policy that requires the court to instruct of its own motion 
on the law relative to corroboration imposes a corresponding 
duty to give cautionary instructions, for the very secrecy 
that precludes corroboration also precludes effective denial. 
The ordinary reaction to an accusation of a sex offense usually 
committed' in secret is that the offense has been committed, 
and a necessary safeguard against injustice is a warning to 
view such accusations cautiously. 
[5] The circumstances of the case must determine whether 
the failure to instruct the jury constitutes ,prejudicial error. 
(People v. Britton, 6 CaL (2d) 10 [56 P. (2d) 491].) In 
People v. Garrett, supra, a judgment of conviction for viola-
tion of section 288 of the Penal Code, resting upon the uncor-
roborated testimony of. a ten-year-old child who apparently 
had been coached before testifying was reversed for ref)lsal of 
the trial court to give a cautionary instruction. (See, also, 
Conners v; State, supra.) In People v. Lucas, supra, a failure 
to give a cautionary instruction did not constitute reversible 
error where an examination of the record disclosed that the 
evidence clearly pointed to the appellant's guilt. It is appar-
ent from the record in the present case, however" that the 
failure to give a cautionary instruction was prejudicial and 
that a different verdict would not have been improbable had 
the error not occurred. The complaining witness, a twelve-
year-old boy, testified that while he was riding in appellant's 
automobile appellant placed his hand on the boy's leg. When 
asked to show where, he placed his hand, according to the 
court's description, "pretty close to the groin, I would say, 
on the front of the leg though, right directly on the front of 
the leg opposite the groin." The witness went on to testify 
that during a drive of from five to ten minutes appellant 
rubbed and patted his leg approximately nine or ten times; 
that after arriving at appellant's rooming house appellant 
changed his clothes in the boy's presence, meanwhile asking 
the boy if he wanted to see appellant's private parts; and that 
while at the rooming house appellant again' patted the wit-
ness' leg. The testimony disclosed that appellant did not at 
any time top.ch the boy's bare skin or make any attempt to 
unfasten his trousers. The witness, having testified that appel-
lant "felt" or "touched" his private parts while they were 
driving to appellant's rooming house, was interrogated by the 
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court as follows:." Q. Did he ever take your private. parts in 
his hand Y A. No, he did not. He felt them. Q. How did he 
feel them? A. He ran his hand over. them. Q. How many 
times Y A. Only the once." At the preliminary hearing the, 
witness testified that while driving in the car appellant placed 
his hand on the witness' leg only three or four times and 
when asked if appellant then touched his private parts, an-
swered that "he did in the house." Appellant denied the 
charges. The jury was properly instructed that a witness is 
presumed to speak the truth, but it was not cautioned as to. 
the testimony of the prosecuting witness. In view of the cir-
cumscribed extent of the acts alleged and the. inconsistencies 
in the witness' testimony, it is doubtful whether the same, 
verdict would have been rendered had the cautionary instruc-
tion been given. , 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for new 
trial are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Peters, 
J. pro tem., concurred. ' 
~:' 
